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Abstract: This study investigates academic entrepreneurship within a prism of the triple helix model of 
innovation relating university, industry, and government. The study adopts a sociological approach, defines 
academic entrepreneurship as a social game, and aims to unravel the mechanisms of relations within the triple 
helix that arise in oil-rich regions, using oil-rich Nigeria as case.  In particular, it focuses on how socio-economic-
political institutions of rentierism within these regions influence commercialization of findings of research. 
The study argues that the structural powers that shape academic entrepreneurship in different environments 
are governed by the interdependencies between agency and socio-economic -political institutions. This is in line 
with the prevalent claim that institutions impose rules that constitute constraints and enablers of agency. This 
study however argues that agential actions are not mere rules-compliance, rather they are strategic calculations 
based on pragmatic contingent decisions about what works best within given institutional dynamics.  
The study employs Bourdieu’s sociology as the conceptual framework, underpinned by critical realist philosophy. 
It uses data from multiple sources to transcend the agency-structure divide, and unearths the various conflicts, 
tensions, struggles and negotiations between the three players in the triple helix in oil-rich environments. 
Findings of the study offer new insights to academic researchers, industrialists, governments, and policy makers 
especially in knowledge-driven economies. It identifies and highlights the points of divergence of the key players 
in the fields of innovation and entrepreneurship. The findings are also of significance to innovation and regional 
development policy-makers as they offer insights into what works, what doesn’t work and what may never work 
regarding policy; and illustrates that entrepreneurship and innovation policies that are effective in one clime 
may not necessarily be effective in another, thus highlighting the critical importance of institutional 
considerations in entrepreneurship and innovation policy-making. 
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Introduction:  
Academic entrepreneurship stimulates economic growth (Audretsch, 2006). Natural resource-rich rentier states 
differ from production states, prevalently deriving its income from external rents from natural resources, in 
contrast to production that tax domestic economic activities for income (Beblawi & Luciani,1987). This paper 
takes a sociological perspective and conceptualizes academic entrepreneurship as a game. Scharle (2002) 
defines ‘gaming’ "as an activity involving more than one participant, where... the moves of the participants 
correspond to a pattern of complementary roles, the participants (either individuals or groups) have specific goals 
and driving strategies, the moves are motivated by the outcome of the game and by the pay-offs". Academic 
entrepreneurship is a Social Game where opportunities for utilization of findings of academic research are 
discovered, evaluated, and exploited through actions of individuals who aim at advancing their social positions 
by the pursuit of the various forms of capital presented by the commercialization of findings of research. 
Impact of contextual institutions on academic entrepreneurship is discussed by Siegel (2006), and Jones-Evans 
(1998) argues that "academic entrepreneurship is a phenomenon that exists in a range of different institutional 
and regional settings” (p.103). Formal and informal institutions underpin social order and pivot the dialectic 
between entrepreneurs and their wider societies. This study therefore focuses on rentierism, a socio-economic 
construct that shapes institutional outlook of rentier regions, and investigates its impact on academic 
entrepreneurship. 
In his triple helix model of innovation, Etzkowitz (2008) discusses universities, governments, and industries as 
the key players in Academic Entrepreneurship; he states: “university, industry, and government enter into a 
reciprocal relationship with each other in which each attempts to enhance the performance of the other” (p. 8). 
Academic entrepreneurship conceptualized as a game implies that the three agential groups in the triple helix 
are in a game-like (Dallas & Zapalska, 2006) relationship. This study therefore focuses on understanding the 
various position takings and game strategies (Bourdieu, 1996) by players in academic entrepreneurship game, 
with focus on the dialogues, negotiations, tensions and struggles (Bourdieu, 1990) between the three players, 
and how these relate with the socio-economic structures of a rentier ‘games arena’, and how the position-
takings, relations, strategies, rules, roles, and pay-offs shape academic entrepreneurship in these environments. 
Literature review 
Strands of literature exist on how natural resources influence regional socio-economic and political topography, 
including how the rentier apparatus shapes government, economy, politics, and even behaviour. The Dutch 
disease thesis (Corden, 1984) for instance blames resource wealth for the comparatively slow economic growth 
in resource-rich countries. Collier & Hoeffler (2005) link mineral wealth with violent conflicts, Harford & Klein 
(2005) cited resource wealth as the determinant of institutions, while Karl (1997) argues that oil booms caused 
a destabilization of governance structures and national capacities. Yates (1996) posit that “the conditioning 
factor of economic stagnation and political authoritarianism in oil-dependent states is the corrosive effect of 
external rent”. 
 
The effects of oil wealth on national institutions are well documented in African, Middle Eastern, American, 
Asian, as well as European oil-rich states; the European Oil-rich Russia is identified as a rentier. Xu (2015) states 
that "mineral fuels take up a proportion of 70% in Russia’s total export" (p.47), while Algieri (2011), and Kalcheva 
& Oomes (2007) find oil wealth in Russia to have produced: relative de-industrialisation, contraction in non-oil 
exports, and a real wage growth; a trend associated with African, Asian, Middle-Eastern and South-American 
rentiers. This work investigates how the institutional dynamics of oil rentier states influence academic 
entrepreneurship. The study strengthens entrepreneurship and rentier state literature by adding to knowledge 
regarding influence of external rents on entrepreneurship. 
Three perspectives dominate Academic entrepreneurship research: the individual, the process, and the context. 
Perspectives on the individual focus on the characteristics of agents (Mosey & Wright, 2007), or entrepreneurial 
teams (O'Shea, et al., 2005), and influence of agents’ social capital or networks (Mosey & Wright, 2007), main 
argument being that some academics are better predisposed to commercialize their findings as a result of their 
personality, psychological characteristics, or possession of scarce knowledge that helps in creating, identifying, 
and seizing opportunities offered by research findings. Process-based studies address the courses of action that 
transform research outputs into economic values, seeking to understand the speeds, stages, typologies, and 
determinants of success (Knockaert, et al 2011). More recent works bring into account the impact of contextual 
situations; three levels of analysis emerge in this regard: individual, organizational, and regional levels. While 
they contextualized studies identify the geographies of their studies, they often fail to identify the institutional 
forces that govern action in these geographies. 
Failure to identify and account for the contextual institutional dynamics at play in the contexts studied weakened 
several of these previous studies. This study therefore gains strength by identifying rentierism as the socio-
economic predicator underlying institutions in oil-rich regions. Influence of natural resource abundance on 
academic entrepreneurship is rarely studied, and account at a multi-level is rarely given of the underlying socio-
economic dynamics that govern academic entrepreneurship; these are gaps in knowledge this study fills. 
Theoretical framework 
Research Philosophy and Analytical Framework 
Critical realism is the underpinning philosophy of this study. Critical realism as the underpinning philosophy 
requires that this study provides account not only of concrete structures that enable or constrain agential action, 
but also that objectively inaccessible subjective structures within agents, and underlying instigative powers and 
mechanisms of relations that generate, constrain, or shape agency in rentier states be brought into the analysis.  
The analytical framework for this study is based on Bourdieu's (1977) theory of practice. Bourdieu’s sociology 
serves for this study, as mediator of the tension between objectivism and subjectivism, enabling transcendence 
of the three levels of analysis (individual, organisational, and regional). It reconciles external social structures 
with subjective experience of agents thereby opening avenues for logical illustration of the social governance of 
academic entrepreneurship. 
Bourdieu's theory of practice has its foundation on his thesis that choices and preferences of social agents in 
diverse domains of practice have basis on agential internal dispositions and their external social positions. 
Bourdieu refers to these dispositions as ‘habitus’, a product of the objective conditions that agents encountered 
and encounters; an embodiment within agents of the structural constraints and enablers within their 
environment, that provide them with personally configured rules of their games; what Bourdieu termed 
“structuring structures” (Bourdieu, 1977, p.72). 
Forms of Capital 
Bourdieu’s concept of capital is intended to extend account of society beyond Marxian economic models that 
limit analysis of society to concrete economic assets. Bourdieu’s concepts of capital “extend economic 
calculation to all the goods, material and symbolic, without distinction, that present themselves as rare and 
worthy of being sought after in a particular social formation” (Bourdieu, 1977, p.177). Capital is “accumulated 
labour (in its materialised form or its ‘‘incorporated,’’ embodied form), which, when appropriated on a private, 
i.e., exclusive, basis by agents or groups of agents, enables them to appropriate social energy in the form of 
reified or living labour” (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 241). To Bourdieu, the various resources available to agents becomes 
conceptualized as capital "when they function as a 'social relation of power', that is, when they become objects 
of struggle as valued resources” (Swartz, 1997 p.74). 
Capital “can present itself in three fundamental guises: as economic capital, which is immediately and directly 
convertible into money and may be institutionalized in the forms of property rights; as cultural capital, which is 
convertible, on certain conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalized in the forms of educational 
qualifications; and as social capital, made up of social obligations (‘connections’), which is convertible, in certain 
conditions, into economic capital…” (Bourdieu, 1986 p.82).  
Habitus 
Every agent possesses a system of disposition emergent from their past history, present situation, and future 
expectations. Agents in proximate positions within the social space possess specific modes of thinking about the 
world, of interpreting the world, and of behaving in the world; Bourdieu terms these modes of apprehending 
the world as ‘habitus’ (Bourdieu, 1977). Bourdieu considers habitus a reflection or reproduction of the 
hierarchical social structures and positions existent within the agent’s environment. The concept of habitus is 
crucial in the analysis of the society, since it is through the same mechanisms that mental dispositions (habitus) 
reproduce 'images' of the existing social world that the 'rules of the game' within the fields of power are also 
reproduced (ibid). Implication is that decisions or choices, including choices of field strategies conform to the 
mental, or dispositional conditions characterising the agents’ existence, history, and personal trajectories 
(Bourdieu, 2000) since they are the conditioners of the agent’s habitus. 
Methodology 
This study followed a three-phase, seven-stage process; the process is set out in Table 1. 
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Quantitative Data 
Quantitative data on the forms, volumes and configurations of capital 
held by the agents under investigation is collected. 
Qualitative Data 
Desk data and interview data that shed light on the mind dispositions, 
actions and practices of the agents is collected. 
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Construction of the Social 
space 
Quantitative data is used to spatially locate agents based on their 
volumes and configurations of capital. 
Separating the fields within 
the field of power 
Once the social space has been constructed, the distinct fields are 
identifiable. Characteristics these fields are identified and specified. 
Identifying homologies in 
the fields 
Identifying objects, events, dispositions, tendencies, etc. that are 
specific (or homologous) to the each of the identified fields. 
M
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s Relating events, actions, 
habitus and fields 
Relational stage, focuses on relating the various objects, events, 
dispositions, etc. identified in the earlier stage. 
Validation Using existing theory and literature to validate the findings. 
Table 1. Summary of the research process 
Sources of Data 
The research data consist of quantitative data on volumes and configurations of capital held by agents, 
qualitative data from desk research, and interview data that illustrate dispositions, choices, and actions of the 
agents. The survey involved self-reported closed questions involving twenty-one academic entrepreneurs. This 
was followed up with semi-structured interviews involving eleven (11) out of the twenty-one (21) agents; the 
data is applied to develop the social space of academic entrepreneurship.  
Analysis of Data 
Analysis of data starts with plotting the social space using the quantitative data. The forms, volumes and 
configuration of capital the respondents hold position them differentially on the social space. Within the 
resulting social space, the various proximate groups and specific properties of each field are identified, and 
analysis shifts focus to identifying the various homologies and oppositions between the various groups, in 
particular, their underlying categories of perception and thought (habitus), and  distinctive practices. The final 
stage of the analysis is relational, where retroduction (Danermark, 2002) and logic is applied to establish the 
relational mechanisms between the forms of capital, agential habitus, action, and practice. This stage illustrates 
the various power struggles, position takings, inter-agential and inter-group tensions, struggles, negotiations, 
and their relations with wider societal structures; this is the mechanism of relating that governs academic 
entrepreneurship within the context studied. 
Findings 
The social space 
The resulting social space show three distinct fields that constitute Etzkowitz’s (2008) triple helix model: 
Government, Industry, and Academia (figure 1). The government field occupies the top right position, making it 
the dominant field (Bourdieu 1984). The academic field occupies the bottom left position being the dominated 
field, while the Industry field occupies an intermediate position between the government and the academic 
fields. The constructed social space is shown in figure. 1. 
 
 
Figure.1. The social space 
Field Properties 
Data from desk research, literature, and inferences from the interviews are used to build up a qualitative 
description of the three distinct fields within the space. These, alongside ‘field actions’ are represented in ‘the 
space of action’ (Figure 3); and a comparison of the field properties is tabulated in table 2. 
 
Field Property Government Field Industry Field Academic Field 
Access to rents Direct (high) Earned (low) Indirect (intermediate) 
Academic knowledge Low Intermediate High 
Technical power Low High Intermediate 
Business skills Low High Intermediate 
Rent-seeking High Low Intermediate 
Research skills Low Intermediate High 
Table 2. Comparison of properties across the three fields 
Habitus in the three fields of academic entrepreneurship 
Agents within the three fields possess different habitus conditioned by the life trajectories of its agents. Although 
no two individuals possess the same habitus, individuals with similar life trajectories may possess “similarities in 
their habitus and lifestyle” (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 93). Interview data was used to produce the resulting space of 
academic entrepreneurial dispositions (figure 2.) 
 
Figure 2. The space of dispositions 
Action in the three fields of academic entrepreneurship 
Agents and agential groups in the social space strategize and compete at various fronts, the ultimate being “to 
maintain or enhance their positions in the social order" (Swartz, 2012, p.210).  The agents, consciously or 
unconsciously are 'aware' of their positions in the social order, aware of the resources within the social space, 
aware of the constraining and enabling properties of their particular fields, aware of the powers and limits of 
powers of their positions, and strategize to maintain or advance their positions in the social order by "preserving, 
reinforcing, or transforming their stock of capital" (ibid); or converting them to preferred new forms. 
This study uncovered five entrepreneurial actions homologous to the three fields of academic entrepreneurship, 
these five typologies of entrepreneurial actiondefine the practice of academic entrepreneurship in a rentier 
state (table 3). 
Action Description 
Accessive  Actions of agents aimed at gaining access to the rentier capital. Accessive action pervade the 
entire social space and permeates all the three fields. 
Assessive  Assessing commercialization proposals to determine their commercial values, market 
potentials and suitability. Assessive actions are homologous with industry field. 
Mediative  Bridging the gap between demands of the society and supplies that satisfy the demands. 
Mediative actions are homologous with the industry field 
Creative  Creation of new knowledge through research; homologous with the academic field. 
Allocative  Distributing from coffers of the state, necessary resources for the execution of the academic 
entrepreneurial actions; this is homologous to the government field. 
Table 3. Typologies of academic entrepreneurial action in a rentier state 
Other entrepreneurial actions within the various fields are represented on the space of action (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3. The space of action 
Discussion 
Symbolic Violence within the fields 
Agents within the three fields capitalize on resources available and opportunities presented by their fields to 
further enhance incomes accessible to them, they develop accessive strategies that enable legitimate or 
illegitimate access to the rentier capital. The dominant position of the government field and the dominated 
position of the academic field polarizes the main struggles between these two fields, each striving to access 
maximum possible capital from the circuit. The industry field is neutral in these struggles, its neutral position 
being homologous with the intermediate position it occupies on the social space. The field has no access to the 
rentier circuit, therefore focuses on maximizing the profitability of its activities, refusing to be involved in 
commercialization activities when its profitability is not demonstrable.  
Employment serves as a primary channel for converting cultural capital into economic capital (Weis, 2009). 
Cultural capital in this regards relate mostly to education, experience and skills acquired over time and embodied 
within agents. In any given society there are different categories of employment and different salary levels, 
agents are consciously or unconsciously aware of their social positions and will seek employment, and negotiate 
a salary that corresponds to their positions. When government is the employer, agents negotiate their rewards 
not as mere reflection of work, but as reflection of their social positions, and reflection of rents accruing to the 
state. Government agents deploy the power and control they retain over the rents from petroleum to enhance 
and maintain their dominant position over other fields in the social space. Even in the face of possible illegality 
of such actions, the government field utilizes the political power at its disposal to justify and legitimize approvals 
of enormously high levels of salaries for their field, in this way widens the social gap and power distances 
between the field and the other two fields. This is the strategy of symbolic violence (Bourdieu& Thompson, 
1991). 
There is also an apprehension of instability of the field and its vulnerability to destabilization by the elites. The 
government field guards against this by seeking the support of the elites by funding their interests. “oil rents 
accrue directly in the hands of the state, and loyalty to the state is gained through patron–client networks which 
help increase political stability, giving the government a certain measure of legitimacy” (Franke, Gawrich, & 
Alakbarov, 2009, p. 112). This works in favour of the academic field, as the government invests in research and 
commercialization of its findings, not out of genuine desire to encourage wealth-creation through 
commercializing findings, rather aimed at maintaining and consolidating their positions in the field by appeasing 
the elitist academic field. "Instead of attending to the task of expediting the basic socio-economic 
transformations, they devote the greater part of their resources to guarding the status quo" (Cook, 1970, p.443).  
The academic field is the dominated field , agents in this field access the rentier capital primarily through salaried 
employment, as the field lacks direct access to the rentier circuit, and lacks the political power and structure 
required to set the dynamism of the social space in its favour in contrast to the government field. As a result the 
salary levels in the academic field more than those of the government field follow the work-reward causation, 
while those of the government field follow the tides of the state’s income from petroleum, rising when petro-
income rises and reluctantly downwardly adjusted when income dwindles.  
To enhance income levels of the field, the academic field resorts to a strategy of undermining the state structure, 
thereby threatening stability of the government field. This is often in form of strikes, industrial action, public 
criticism and activism. Agents in this field are aware of their stock of cultural capital which is acquired over long 
periods of time, rendering their positions rare and inimitable. Having acquired legitimacy, credibility and trust 
of the general population above the government field as a result of its social disposition, the wider population 
are more inclined to listen to the voice from academia over that from the government field, government field 
being apprehended by the population as untrustworthy, deceitful and kleptomaniac. Aware that government 
cannot afford a substitute to their rare skills, knowledge, and experience, the academic field deploys the 
symbolism of their rare position in the social space as tools of symbolic violence to rattle the government. The 
government field responds by enhancing funding made available to the field to fund their research and its 
commercialization.  
These funds are however often misapprehended by the academics as earned income, thus misappropriated, but 
justified with basic research that has little or no potential for commercialization; hence the commercialization 
effort fails. Funding being provided through this mechanism explains why the government’s expenditure on the 
projects are rarely monitored; it serves to purchase the indulgence of the academic field.  
Although some of these practices are ordinarily identified as ‘corrupt’, they form part of the power struggles in 
a rentier state. In the European rentier state of Russia for example, Lane (1999) reports that corrupt activities 
form "part of the politics of confrontation", and are better understood "as an indication of power struggles 
between Russias's political and economic elites" (p. 97), and that the Russian oil and gas wealth has resulted in 
"the triumph of rent-seeking over profit-seeking" (p.181). Osipian (2012) argues that the widespread corruption 
in Russian universities results from the quest by the state to “derive its rent not in money but in loyalty to the 
regime" (p.153). These findings even in European Rentier states illustrate the rentier institutional dynamics that 
produce the unfavourable commercialization outcomes identified in this study. 
The Russian science-technological complex founded in 2010 was aimed at commercializing new Russian 
technologies, but academics (eg. Dezhina, 2010) criticize the project as being hijacked by the dominant "narrow 
circle of government officials" (p.108) to the detriment of innovation firms and researchers, and was 
administered through political rather than scientific considerations, and decision about its location politically 
motivated (ibid). Liuhto (2010) argues that these government projects, although Russia’s best innovation 
promotion measures, but the state is too involved for them to “form an effective, flexible, and sustainable 
innovation system” (p.99). 
Conclusion 
Access to the external rents- driver of action 
This study finds that the major driver of action in rentier states is access to the rentier circuits. Earlier studies eg. 
Grant (2014) finds in rentier states, favouristic employment and political appointments as classic means of 
gaining access to the rents, “jobs and contracts and licences are given as an expression of patronage and 
clientelism rather than as reflection of sound economic rationale” (Grant,2014). In Russia Satarov (2000) found 
that the competition that exists in Russia "is principally that of competition for rents" (p.113). Social position and 
clientelism rather than suitability for the role determines who gets employed or appointed to positions, hence 
efficiency of academic entrepreneurship efforts are hindered. When unqualified and uncommitted persons, 
given such roles merely as means for them to access rentier capital via employment occupy strategic job 
positions that deal with commercialization, misappropriation of funds follow, and the agents most likely lack the 
relevant skills, knowledge and drive to carry the role through. This gets further complicated by the shift in the 
focus of the government agents from how to achieve successful commercialization projects, to how to 
illegitimately gain access to the rentier circuits through the opportunities offered by the commercialization 
process. This explains why investments made towards commercialization produce mismatched outcomes. 
The dynamics of the triple helix in a rentier state 
Further, this study finds that the triple helix model works differently in rentier regions. Etzkowitz (2008) states 
that triple helix relations in knowledge-based societies result when “university, industry, and government enter 
into a reciprocal relationship with each other in which each attempts to enhance the performance of the other”(p. 
8). Similarly Fetterman & Wandersman (2005) states that “the three partners in the relationship work together 
to build upon one another's strengths to achieve results. But this study finds contrast in the structure and 
dynamism of this relationship in rentier regions. In rentier states the three partners support each other only to 
fulfil their obligations, rather than to enhance performance; and to ingratiate self both the public and the others 
if it such ingratiation supports their cause. The three partners rather strive to advance themselves and gain 
advantage even to the detriment of one another. 
This study finds that the triple helix of innovation in a rentier state involve intra-relational struggles and tensions 
that hinder its effectiveness. Among the major functions of the government within the relationship is making 
policy initiatives and providing enabling environment such as intellectual property regimes and law 
enforcement. But the institutional dynamics of rentier states however dictate that it is in the interest of the 
government that these institutions remain weak, as Bratton & Van de Walle (1997) explains “In most rentier 
states, the ruling elite often undermine institutional integrity to protect their own rent-seeking interests” (p.19). 
Sound legal system is required for academic entrepreneurship to flourish, but the rentier government rather 
supports the status quo of weak institutions; this in the overall works against intellectual property ownership, 
and stifles academic entrepreneurship. 
Owing to the peculiarity of academic entrepreneurship in rentier regions, it is recommended that governments 
and policy-makers before borrowing policy initiatives from other regions should first scrutinize them under the 
prism of their peculiar institutional outlook. Especially for natural-resource rich regions, an evidence that such 
policy initiatives worked in one region does not guarantee that it would work in others. 
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